American Educational Research Journal VOLUME 5 NUMBER 1 JANUARY 1968 inhibition," and "experimental neurosis" (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 68-87, 284-319). The human analogues of these phenomena, I believe, can be observed in some elementary schools as early as the first grade. The symptoms are like those described by Pavlov. The whole educational process-classroom, desks, blackboards, books, and especially teachers-seem to become conditioned inhibitors for all forms of classroom learning. We know that conditioned inhibitors can become aversive stimuli. I began to wonder how much of the inattentiveness, aimless hyperactivity, and active resistance to learning that I observed in some first-graders was a result of undesirable environmental influences outside the school and how much was actually generated in the classroom-a manifestation of Pavlov's "experimental neurosis." If this analogy is more than just analogy and is indeed the phenomenon described by Pavlov, we know it should be harder to cure than to prevent. At present we are not sure just how to prevent it.
Repeated inappropriate and unrewarding experiences early in the child's schooling may act as insurmountable barriers for children who, through a different approach, might have been capable of achieving a rewarding education. Insistence on surmounting uniform requirements, such as acquiring the three Rs at an early stage of schooling, could screen out some children from ever entering upon any path of educational fulfillment in our present system. I believe individual differences and group differences must be studied-in both their genetic and environmental aspects-for the purpose of creating optimal diversity of educational opportunity. The goal should not be literal equality of opportunity, meaning uniform treatment, but equality of opportunity for diversity of educational experiences. This means increased diversity in our methods of instruction. Now, for the first time in history, the new educational technology makes this a feasible goal. Do not misconstrue the aims of this approach as being that of the school's teaching Johnny set theory while it teaches Billy to weave baskets. Both Johnny and Billy will learn as much set theory as they can at the most appropriate time for them and by the means best suited to their individual abilities. There will always be individual differences in educational paths and their outcomes, but it may be hoped that the reality of individual differences need not mean educational rewards for some and utter frustration and defeat for others.
The whole complex process of classroom instruction as we know it has evolved in relation to a relatively small upper-class segment of Anglo-European stock. The modal pattern of development in learning abilities of this group has probably shaped to a considerable degree the particular educational procedures public education has long regarded as standard for everyone, regardless of differences in cultural background or inherited patterns of ability. So far, we have not successfully met the challenge presented by our ideal of a rewarding education for all segments of the population rather than for just one segment relatively homogeneous in genetic and cultural background.
Since one of the aims of educational research is the discovery and manipulation of sources of variance in school learning, I wish to outline what appears to me to be the present status of our knowledge concerning hereditary sources of variance in intelligence and educability and their relations to social class and race. The variables of social class and race are becoming increasingly prominent in educational research, with its current emphasis on children called culturally disadvantaged.
HEREDITARY BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
That individual differences in mental abilities are largely hereditary in origin is well established. We still do not know all the causal links in the chain from genes to mental test scores, but this is another matter and not a necessary condition for establishing the heritability of a trait.
The polemics of the heredity-environment question have largely revolved around certain unfortunate misconceptions. One misconception is the idea that heredity-environment is a dichotomy -that a given trait is the result of either heredity or environment. Actually, the concept of heritability refers to the genetically determined proportion of variance in individual differences in a trait.
Heritability is a continuous variable, taking values between o and i.
Another misconception is the idea that inherited characteristics are immutable while environmentally acquired characteristics are easily changed. According to this view, to say that a trait is hered- itary is tantamount to fatalism. This is incorrect. The degree of heritability of a behavioral trait simply indicates the extent to which variability is controlled by internal biological rather than social-psychological influences. Determination of the heritability of a behavior trait tells us the source of influences-biological or psychological-to which the trait is most susceptible, rather than the degree of immutability of the trait. A well-known example is the hereditary defect called PKU (phenylketonuria), a metabolic abnormality which formerly resulted in mental retardation but which today can be alleviated by eliminating a certain amino acid (phenylalanine) from the child's diet.
A more subtle misconception, which has been the basis for more needless argument than perhaps any other, concerns quantitative statements about heritability. These used to be referred to as the nature-nurture ratio. The misconception here is that a single true value for the heritability of a given trait can eventually be established by making more and more careful and precise measurements with better and better instruments. Thus we still hear arguments concerning whether the hereditary contribution to variance in intelligence is 50o percent, 6o percent, 75 percent, or some other amount. In the form in which this question is usually posed and argued, it is unanswerable. But the usual counterargument is equally incorrect: it consists of asserting that we cannot say anything about the relative influences of heredity and environment. The fact is that we can make meaningful statements about the relative roles of heredity and environment in determining individual differences in a trait, provided we are clear about what a given heritability estimate actually tells us.
Ideally, an estimate of heritability should include specification of the relevant amounts of both environmental and genetic variation. Since psychologists do not yet have a true metric for environmental and genetic variation, we have to resort to the next best means of providing answers to the heredity-environment question. This consists of sampling subjects from a specified population and making heritability estimates in this sample. Note that this procedure does not involve direct measurement of either environmental or genetic variation, and this is its shortcoming. The kind of conclusion we can draw from such studies, however, is that, given the environmental and genetic variation in the population we have Social Class, Race, and Genetics sampled, the heritability of the trait we are measuring is such and such a value. Actually this is best thought of as a probable range of values, if we take into account sampling error, measurement error, and the particular formula by which heritability is computed (Jensen, 1967) .
There are now a number of excellent studies that have used this approach for estimating the heritability of intelligence. Despite the fact that they have used different intelligence tests and different populations, they are in remarkably close agreement (Erlenmeyer-Kimling & Jarvik, 1963). One reason that heritability estimates are in such close agreement even when the populations sampled may differ in the amount of environmental variation is that there is probably a positive correlation between the quality of environment and genetic potential for intelligence. The result is that when we sample a wider range of environmental variation, we concomitantly obtain a wider range of genetic variation. The fact that we can determine the heritability of a trait like intelligence in a given population does not, of course, answer the question of what are the extreme limits through which intelligence can be affected by environmental influences. Nevertheless it is meaningful and useful to know the heritability of a trait under the prevailing conditions. It should be noted that as social conditions improve, as environmental disadvantages are lessened, as equality of educational opportunity becomes a reality, the heritability of intelligence and achievement will increase, because of the decrease in environmental sources of variation. Advancement toward the humanitarian goals of a democratic society ensures that diversity of abilities and achievement will be due more and more to heredity than to environment. tential depends upon the presence of certain environmental influences. Beyond some threshold level of favorable environmental influences, however, further increases do not make for appreciable increments in ability. An analogy is the effect of diet on physical stature. When the diet is deficient in certain vitamins and minerals, growth is stunted, but when the minimal daily requirement is provided, growth will be normal and further supplements to the diet will produce no appreciable effect. If the bulk of the population sampled in a heritability study is above the threshold value on the relevant environmental variable, the heritability estimate will be very high, as in Burt's study. This concept is illustrated in The phenotype/genotype ratio can be thought of as the degree to which the potential for development (genotype) is realized in values. Now let us return to the Skeels studies, which show dramatic boosts in IQ. Let me give you some impression of the early environmental conditions in which children were reared in the most frequently cited study by Skeels. The study has been interpreted as demonstrating that when such deprived children between two and three years of age are transferred from a less to a more stimulating environment and then are reared to adulthood in good foster homes, their IQs show an average rise of about 30 points. The infants in the Skeels study were kept in an orphanage nursery up to about 2 to 3 years of age, then were placed in a psychologically much more favorable environment prior to adoption into good homes. Here is Skeels' description of these children's environment during this period: "The babies were kept in standard hospital cribs that often had protective sheeting on the sides, thus effectively limiting visual stimulation; no toys or other objects were hung in the infant's line of vision. Human interactions were limited to busy nurses who, with the speed born of practice and necessity, changed diapers or bedding, bathed and medicated the infants, and fed them efficiently with propped bottles" (Skeels, 1966, p. 3). Beyond infancy the children were moved into small dormi-tories containing two to five large cribs. Skeels comments that up to two years of age "Interactions with adults were largely limited to feeding, dressing, and toilet details. Few play materials were available, and there was little time for teaching play techniques. Most of the children had a brief play period on the floor; a few toys were available in the beginning of such periods, but if any rolled out of reach there was no one to retrieve it. Except for short walks out of doors, the children were seldom out of the nursery room" (Skeels, 1966, p. 4) .
Despite this extreme deprivation in early life, these children's average IQ at 6 years of age was 95.9, with a standard deviation of 16.3. Thus, they were only four points below the national average and had about the same variability as the general population. Most of them became average, self-sufficient adults (Skeels, 1966) . Environmentalists who cite these studies, however, apparently fail to note an important difference in the behavior of these chilren prior to their placement in a stimulating environment and the behavior of the majority of culturally disadvantaged children to whom these results are often generalized. The typical culturally disadvantaged child in his first two years does not show deficiencies in performance on the usual infant tests of intelligence, such as the Gessell or Bayley scales (Bayley, 1965 ). Behavior and development appear quite normal up to this age. On the other hand, the average IQ of the children in Skeels' study, at an average age of 19 months, was only 64. The deficits of the Skeels' children are thus not directly comparable to those of the typical disadvantaged child.
A number of researchers are now attempting to pinpoint environmental variables relevant to various stages of intellectual development. The working hypothesis essentially is that certain psychological environmental variables, largely those involving parent-child interaction, are distributed differently in the disadvantaged segment of the population than in the rest of the population. This hypothesis is illustrated in a region in which genetic potential for intellectual development is not fully realized in performance. This seems a plausible hypothesis. One way of testing the hypothesis that a particular segment of the population is intellectually handicapped because. of its position on the environmental continuum would be to carry out a heritability study within this segment of the population. If the hypothesis represented by Figure 2 has any merit, heritability estimates should be significantly lower for groups reared in the more disadvantaged part of the environmental continuum. Here, then, is one feasible means of directly testing the hypothesis that Negroes perform below most other groups on tests of intelligence and scholastic achievement because of environmental rather than genetic differences.
Social Class, Race, and Genetics SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES Socioeconomic status (SES) is generally recognized as one of the most prominent correlates of tested intelligence and school achievement. The occupational hierarchy associated with SES, which is highly related to the amount of knowledge, skill, and education required for performance in various occupations, acts as an intellectual screening device. The fewer restraints society places on social mobility, the more the assortment into various occupations and socioeconomic strata will be determined by innate potential. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that a substantial proportion of the differences in intelligence and achievement among SES levels has a hereditary basis. This is not to say, however, that SES differences in life style, child-rearing practices, and the like, do not also play an important role in the development of educationally relevant skills, attitudes, and values.
Let me emphasize that this statement applies only within racial groups but cannot now be generalized across racial groups. The reason is obvious: if intellectually irrelevant racial characteristics such as skin color act to any degree as a barrier to social mobility -as is unfortunately still the case in many parts of our societyinnate ability will be denied full opportunity for its development or expression.
As we have already seen, individual intelligence tests such as the Stanford-Binet are not so culturally biased as to be incapable of reflecting genetic factors, at least for a large majority of the population. If the results of heritability studies such as those of Burt, of Newman, Freeman and Holzinger, and of Shields, are accepted as valid, as I believe they must be until contrary evidence is forthcoming-it almost inevitably follows that some of the variance in intelligence among social classes must be genetic. This is important for us to know, because it is unrealistic to expect social or educational reforms to wipe our ability differences between groups, when the groups differ in part because of genetic factors.
There are several lines of evidence for this conclusion that SES differences have a genetic as well as an environmental basis. I will mention only three of the least technical.
The first is a reductio ad absurdum of the position that individual differences are largely determined by heredity but that social class differences are entirely determined by non-genetic factors. An important feature that is intentionally omitted from Figure 4 for the sake of graphic clarity is that each of the points represents the mean of a distribution of IQs, and each distribution has considerable dispersion about its mean. Thus one can find extremely dull children born to brilliant parents and extremely bright children born to very dull parents. The observation that "like begets like" is seldom surprising either on the basis of heredity or en-vironment. However, for polygenically inherited traits it is often that "like begets unlike". This is expected from genetic principles, and it is what we find in the case of intelligence.
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A third line of evidence is the simplest and most direct of all. It is based on the study of children reared in orphanages. One of the best studies examined 269 illegitimate children who were placed in an orphanage before the age of one year and kept there until at least age o10,o. The occupational status of each child's father was rated on a five-point scale. This occupational rating, which is the best single index of SES, showed a correlation of .23 with the children's Stanford-Binet IQs at the age of 10o, which did not differ significantly from the correlation of .24 in a control group of home-reared children (Lawrence, 1931) .
RACIAL DIFFERENCES
Racial differences in mental abilities, whatever their sources, must be taken into account if programs are to be developed to make schooling more beneficial for more of our population. This, of course, is the intention of large-scale programs such as Project Head Start.
One may ask, why bring race into the picture? Are not all differences in mental test scores and school performance due to environmental and social-class differences? If we cannot define "race" with perfect precision, have we any business using it as a variable in our psychological or educational research? My answer to these questions, as an educational psychologist, is wholly operational and pragmatic. I assume that one legitimate aim of research is to discover the sources of individual differences in educationally relevant variables such as IQ and school performance. Now, if we have a multiple regression equation made up of a host of socioeconomic and other environmental variables that predict educationally important criteria, and if the prediction is substantially improved by adding the variable called race to the prediction equation, I maintain that race is by definition a relevant and valid variable. For this purpose no more precise definition or criterion for classification by race is needed than the teacher's judgment. In the studies I have reviewed which used this multiple regression approach, the addition of race along with environmental variables has always substantially boosted the total variance accounted for. Hess & Shipman, 1965) . One aim of these researchers has been to go beyond crude socioeconomic variables to find the truly causal environmental influences on educability which are now thought to lie in more subtle psychological aspects of intra-family and inter-personal interactions during the child's development. Our hope is that if such environmental effects can be clearly identified it might be possible through some kind of early educational intervention to boost the child's chances of doing well in school.
There is no question about the large average difference between Negroes and whites in performance on standard intelligence tests and in school performance. The differences, whatever their cause, are so large as to be a major concern to educators. , 1960, p. 342) . We have been able to devise memory-span tests administered under laboratory conditions which have reliabilities comparable to those for height and weight. By manipulating procedural variables, such as stimulus modality (auditory or visual), by varying the interval between presentation and recall, and by several other more complex variations of the digit-span paradigm, it is possible to obtain a profile of factorially independent scores for each subject. These factors derived from laboratory measures of short-term memory are not psychologically trivial. In a sample of 50 University of California undergraduates these factors had a multiple correlation of .76 (.68 after correction for shrinkage) with college grade-point average (Jensen, i965b).
One of the conclusions I draw from the large discrepancies between various subtest scores on standard intelligence tests administered to Negroes is that we probably will not advance our understanding of group differences markedly by collecting more data with global, omnibus tests of general intelligence. Practically all the evidence of Negro-white intellectual differences based on such tests has been reviewed by Shuey (1966) . While this mass of evidence shows great consistency and leaves no doubt concerning the presence of mean differences in measures of the phenotype, I find little information about the extent to which Negro-white differences have a genetic basis. Racial variations have been identified in just about every anatomical or physiological characteristic anyone has chosen to study, and it would be surprising indeed if the brain alone were exempt from this generalization. But the relevance of physiological differences to behavior will still have to be proved in the psychological realm by psychological techniques. As far as I can tell from my search of the relevant literature, research on racial differences does not even begin to permit one to sort out the hereditary and environmental components of the demonstrated phenotypic differences in mental abilities. Therefore, statements concerning the relative importance of Social Class, Race, and Genetics genetic and environmental factors in racial differences can at pressent be nothing but conjecture and surmise. The only answer, I submit, is to transmute conjecture into scientifically testable hypotheses and then do the necessary research. It is good scientific strategy to begin with the simplest possible hypothesis, that is, the one that adds the fewest assumptions to what is already established. Stated in the simplest form, the hypothesis is that the difference between the means of Negroes and whites in tested intelligence is caused by the same factors, operating in the same degrees, that cause differences in intelligence between individuals within either group. I can find no evidence to date in the published literature which would permit rejection of this hypothesis. Future research in this area will contribute little more to our understanding of human differences and will have only meagre educational implications if the emphasis is placed solely on differences in global intelligence tests scores, which reflect only an undifferentiated composite of abilities having unknown weightings in the total test scores. Perhaps our greatest hope of achieving equality of educational opportunity lies in the possibility of finding significant patterns of individual differences in the development of abilities and in taking advantage of these differences to create the optimal Instruction x Pupil interaction. We have some evidence that this can happen in the learning laboratory (Jensen, 1966f) . If it is a false hope for school learning, we can find this out only by making a serious attempt. as intelligence can be both created and widened. If SES level has any relation to genetic factors, and if the differential birth rate for lower and upper socioeconomic classes is appreciably greater in one racial group than in another, one would predict a genetically determined divergence of the means of the two racial groups. The rate of this divergence could be masked for a period of time by improved social, economic, and educational conditions, but this masking would not continue indefinitely if there were some threshold of environmental favorability beyond which further improvements had little effect on the development of intelligence (the hypothesis expressed in Figure 2 ). This concatenation of factors would have extremely important implications for public education's concern with reducing disparities in scholastic achievement among major segments of the population. My attempts to find comprehensive, scientifically based discussions of these issues lead me to the conclusign that the matter is not being studied or explored in any or all of its socially important ramifications. The policy of ignoring this problem might well be viewed by future generations as our society's greatest injustice to Negro Americans. The factual basis of this concern can be found in a recent article by Moynihan (1966) 
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CULTURE-FREE AND CULTURE-FAIR TESTS
The 1950os saw many attempts to devise "culture-free," "culturefair," or "culture-controlled" tests of intelligence (e.g. Eells, et al., 1951) . The purpose of such tests was to discover or demonstrate a true level of intellectual ability in socioeconomically disadvantaged children, presumed to be grossly underestimated by traditional intelligence tests. The usual tests were shown to contain some items which discriminated more than others among social classes. Such items were said to be culturally biased in favor of the middle-class child, and for many test items this was obviously true: identification of musical instruments or exotic animals, the interpretation of bookish proverbs, and the like. Attempts to overcome cultural bias in tests were of two main types. The first was to make up tests of abstract items that would seem to be more or less equally unfamiliar in all social classes; Raven's Progressive Matrices is a good example of this approach. The other approach was to use only items with realistic content presumed to be equally familiar in all socioeconomic strata. The Davis-Eells Games are the best example of this approach. There was one scientific peculiarity about these efforts. In devising a culture-free or culturefair test, the main criterion of success was the extent to which one could narrow the mean difference between SES groups in measured intelligence. The very same test devised to this criterion, it was hoped, could then be used to show that different socioeconomic classes do not differ in intelligence. Though the argument would have been challenged on logical grounds even if this had been demonstrated, the tests failed to perform as expected. All the attempts to make culturally unbiased tests persisted in showing significant SES differences. For example, the Davis-Eells Games, spe-Social Class, Race, and Genetics high correlation with other standard tests of intelligence within culturally homogeneous groups in which the standard tests have been validated, and (b) high heritability estimates across a wide range of environmental variation. If and when these criteria are met, I shall be satisfied that we have a culture-free test, at least within the population in which these two criteria are met.
LEARNING ABILITY AND EDUCABILITY
My approach to these problems has been to think in terms of what I call "basic learning abilities." By "basic" I mean only that we use learning tests that depend relatively little upon mediational processes or specific transfer from previous learning. These learning tests are usually taken individually in the laboratory. The tasks consist of selective trial-and-error learning, free recall, serial and paired-associate learning under various experimental conditions. These techniques yield measures of cognitive learning ability. Let me emphasize that the tasks are not measures of perceptual or motor abilities. Here is the rationale behind this approach: If a child has good basic learning ability, he should be able, given the appropriate environmental input, to acquire the learning sets, mediational habits, verbal associative network, and the reservoir of transferable skills that largely constitute educability. Thus, I think of learning ability as a psychologically more fundamental process than intelligence. The precise nature of the connection between intelligence and the basic learning abilities is one of the main questions in our research (Jensen, 1966f) .
Summarizing the results obtained thus far can be facilitated by means of Figure 13 , which shows a composite average of several learning tests administered to various socioeconomic and ethnic groups. There is such a remarkable consistency in the results that when they are shown graphically, one study looks much like another. The essential finding, illustrated in Figure 13 .What are we to conclude from these findings and what implications might they have for education? First, I will summarize the essentials of this picture: tested IQ correlates highly with learning ability in middle-class children. IQ correlates negligibly with learning ability in lower-class children. Also, there is some indication that in the above-average IQ range lower-class and middle-class children matched on IQ are similar in learning ability. It is mainly in the IQ range from 6o to 8o that lower-class children are significantly superior to low IQ middle-class children in learning ability.
Why then do not lower-class children with low IQs perform better in school than middle-class children with low IQs? To state the question in more general terms, why is the IQ more predictive of school achievement than are direct tests of learning ability? My current thinking on this problem can be explained with the aid of between learning ability and intelligence. Educability is the ability to learn school subjects by means of classroom instruction. Note that raw learning ability is not directly converted to educability but serves educability through the agency of intelligence. To profit from ordinary classroom instruction the learner must bring many developed skills to the situation: the voluntary control of attention, the perception of order, self-initiated rehearsal of newly acquired behavior, self reinforcement for successful performance, autonomous symbolic mediation, and a host of other processes I have described in detail elsewhere (Jensen, in press). In short, the learner himself must be able to act on the instructional input in order to master it. An intelligence test score is one indication of the degree to which a child has the equipment to act so as to be educable by ordinary means.
It seems that it is in the lack of these cognitive skills tapped by intelligence tests and required for educability, rather than in basic learning abilities, that culturally disadvantaged children differ most from typical middle-class children.
What we need to know, and what many researchers are now seeking to find out, is how to transmute learning ability into the
